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Abstract. Hardware tokens for user authentication need a secure and usable
mechanism to lock them when not in use. The Pico academic project proposes
an authentication token unlocked by the proximity of simpler wearable devices
that provide shares of the token’s master key. This method, however, is vulnera-
ble to a cold boot attack: an adversary who captures a running Pico could extract
the master key from its RAM and steal all of the user’s credentials. We present
a cryptographic countermeasure—bivariate secret sharing—that protects all the
credentials except the one in use at that time, even if the token is captured while
it is on. Remarkably, our key storage costs for the wearables that supply the cryp-
tographic shares are very modest (256 bits) and remain constant even if the token
holds thousands of credentials. Although bivariate secret sharing has been used
before in slightly different ways, our scheme is leaner and more efficient and
achieves a new property—cold boot protection. We validated the efficacy of our
design by implementing it on a commercial Bluetooth Low Energy development
board and measuring its latency and energy consumption. For reasonable choices
of latency and security parameters, a standard CR2032 button-cell battery can
power our prototype for 5–7 months, and we demonstrate a simple enhancement
that could make the same battery last for over 9 months.
Keywords: Hardware authentication token, cold boot attack, memory remanence, bi-
variate secret sharing, Bluetooth Low Energy
1 Introduction
In 2014 the influential FIDO industry consortium published version 1.0 of its Universal
Authentication Framework specification [1], which defines a token-based authentica-
tion system intended to replace passwords. The token itself might be unlocked with a
variety of methods, such as biometrics. In 2011, Stajano proposed Pico [2], a system
with similar goals and architecture (replacing passwords by a token that locally stores
a different credential per verifier) but with a proximity-based secret-sharing method for
unlocking the token (as originally proposed in 2001 by Desmedt et al. [3]) that would
also allow continuous authentication (similar to what Corner and Noble [4] first demon-
strated in 2002). In this work we revisit the security of the Pico token-unlocking pro-
posal, improving its resilience against memory readout attacks such as “cold boot” [5].
? On sabbatical at the University of Cambridge while this work was being carried out.
We use the Pico terminology throughout, since this is the reference design that we are
improving upon; however, our techniques might also be applied to FIDO UAF or to any
other security token that requires locking when not in possession of its user, provided
it adopted the proximity-based secret-sharing technique called “Threshold things that
think” by Desmedt et al. [3] and “Picosiblings” by Stajano [2]. In this introduction we
first set the scene by summarizing the relevant features of Pico. We then explain what
additional security benefits we provide with our work.
The Pico is a security token containing hundreds of login credentials, stored in en-
crypted form in the token’s permanent memory. Because the Pico’s aim is to allow
people to authenticate without having to remember secrets, by design its storage is not
unlocked by a PIN or password but rather by the presence of other small wearable
devices, the Picosiblings, using a k-out-of-n secret sharing scheme to reconstruct the
strong master key that decrypts the Pico’s storage.3 Without the master key, which is
not stored in the Pico, the encrypted credentials are unreadable. The intention is that, if
adversaries capture the Pico, they will not be able to read its secrets, not even if they
also capture a few Picosiblings. No protection is offered by the scheme, though, if the
adversary manages to capture the Pico and at least k Picosiblings.
To avoid storing the master key in the Pico, the master key is securely erased imme-
diately after having been reconstructed and used. The decrypted credentials themselves
are securely erased after a short interval. Whenever the Pico needs to use any of its
credentials (again), the master key must be reconstructed to allow their decryption, but
reconstruction can only happen if at least k Picosiblings are within range. Therefore a
group of k Picosiblings creates an aura of safety around its wearer, within which the
Pico can unlock its credentials.
The privacy of the wearer would be under threat if a passive observer could recog-
nize the Picosiblings by their transmissions, thereby identifying the wearer and tracking
their location. The security of the credentials would be under threat if an active attacker
could impersonate the target Pico to the Picosiblings and persuade them to release their
shares of the master key. For this reason, the communications between a Pico and its Pi-
cosiblings must be authenticated and encrypted, and the Picosiblings must only respond
to their own Pico.
The primary focus of this paper is to protect the Pico against cold boot attacks. A
cold boot attack consists of capturing the running device while plaintext secrets are in
RAM, power-cycling it without allowing a clean shutdown and then exploiting data
remanence to read its secrets from RAM, as described by Halderman et al. [5]. We
generalize the threat model, beyond the literal cold boot, to any other potential means of
reading the secrets present in RAM at the time the running Pico is captured, regardless
of whether they involve power-cycling the device. The plaintext secrets under threat
would include the credentials themselves, the reconstructed master key used to decrypt
them and the shares of the master key received from the Picosiblings.
3 In Pico, for additional security, some special shares are supplied by user biometrics and by a
network server [2], and different shares may have different weights [6]. The work described
in this paper is independent of these features and therefore for simplicity in what follows we
shall ignore these aspects here and treat all shares equally unless otherwise noted.
1.1 Highlights
Although the individual techniques we use (secret sharing, bivariate polynomials, etc.)
have been proposed before, our variant is original, the way we combine them is original,
and the protection features we achieve have not previously appeared in the literature.
We also build a working prototype and measure its performance. In particular:
We design a new internal architecture for the Pico security token and a communica-
tion protocol between Pico and Picosiblings that, besides meeting all the security and
privacy requirements in the original Pico paper,4 additionally protect the Pico from cold
boot attacks. The hundreds of credentials on the Pico are never all exposed in plaintext,
even within the device: the Pico only unlocks the credentials in use at the time. This
minimizes exposure to any memory readout attacks, however performed.
We partition the Pico credential database into independently encrypted bins. Cru-
cially, our protection scheme is such that the additional key storage cost per Picosibling
is constant with respect to the number of bins.
Whether the credentials in the Pico are public keys or symmetric keys [7], we
achieve the above without resorting to public-key primitives, so as to facilitate energy-
efficient implementation and to avoid introducing a failure point under the threat that
quantum computing might one day break today’s public-key cryptosystems.
We validate our design with a prototype implementation using commercial off-the-
shelf Bluetooth Low Energy parts that demonstrates most of the above features. Work-
ing Picosiblings had never been implemented in hardware before and thus our proto-
type, besides offering enhanced security, is the first concrete instantiation of Picosib-
lings on which performance measurements can be conducted.
2 The problem
In the original design for Pico, as summarized above, the credential storage is encrypted
by a master key that in turn is assembled from cryptographic shares received from the
Picosiblings. If adversaries steal a Pico that has been switched off, they will not be able
to recover the master key (which only exists in temporary storage), nor any of the user’s
credentials (stored in permanent storage, but encrypted under the master key), nor any
of the received shares (which need to be cached in some readable form until at least k
of them have been assembled). The problem, however, is that they might steal a running
Pico, with received shares or decrypted secrets in RAM, and somehow find a way of
reading these shares or secrets while they lie in RAM in plaintext.
A more subtle problem is that, in order to communicate securely with the Picosib-
lings, the Pico needs to store, permanently, some Pico-to-Picosiblings communication
keys. Since the master key that unlocks the storage of the Pico is reconstructed from
shares supplied by the Picosiblings, it is clear that the communication keys to talk to
the Picosiblings cannot be encrypted under the master key, or they would be inacces-
sible when the Pico boots up. But if they are stored in plaintext and accessible to at-
tackers who capture the Pico, then such attackers would be in a position to impersonate
the Pico to the Picosiblings and therefore obtain the shares from them. Stannard and
4 We repeat these requirements in Section 2 for the convenience of the reader.
Stajano [8] acknowledge this threat and invoke some amount of tamper resistance in
order to address it. Clearly, if the Pico’s processor and memory are all enclosed in a
tamper-resistant perimeter, any memory-readout attacks will fall outside the adversary
model. However it is hard for us as independent researchers to constructively validate
the strength of this defense because tamper-resistant system-on-chip devices are usually
only sold to corporations, under NDA and in large volumes.
To protect the security and privacy (including location privacy) of the owner of the
Pico, the original design [2] called for a protocol providing the following features:
– The Pico can ascertain the presence of any of its Picosiblings in the vicinity.
– The Picosibling responds to its master Pico but not to any other Pico.
– At each ping, the Picosibling sends its k-out-of-n share to the Pico, in a way that
does not reveal it to eavesdroppers.
– An eavesdropper can detect the bidirectional communications between Pico and
Picosiblings but not infer identities or long-term pseudonyms.
– The Pico can detect and ignore old replayed messages.
– The Pico can detect and ignore relay attacks (e.g. with Hancke-Kuhn [9]).
Most of these properties were offered in Stannard and Stajano’s protocol [8]; how-
ever, as our current work redefines the communication between Pico and Picosiblings,
these properties must be preserved.
2.1 Attacker model
– We assume the attacker can listen to some of the communications between Pico
and Picosiblings, but not to those of their initial setup and pairing (“secure at first
use”).
– We assume the attacker can send messages to the Pico and/or Picosiblings, but not
during initial setup and pairing.
– We assume the attacker can capture and read out the content of a Pico (whether on
or off) and fewer than k Picosiblings, but only after initial setup and pairing has
taken place.5
– As a concession to the considerations above, we assume it is possible for the de-
fender to use low-cost tamper-proofing facilities of the kind in use in smartcards
and phone SIMs in order to provide a small amount of permanent storage that the
adversary cannot read, even after acquiring physical control of the device.6 We
assume however that the adversary is otherwise able to read out the bulk storage
(flash) and workspace (RAM) of the captured device.
The attacker wins if she can extract all the credentials in plaintext out of a captured
Pico or if she can use a captured Pico to authenticate as its owner (the former implies
the latter).
5 The number of devices compromised by the attacker can never go down (the attacker cannot
“unlearn” the secrets of a device he previously compromised) and any Picosibling that he ever
compromised counts towards the quota that cannot reach k in our adversary model.
6 Note that such protected storage would be needed by Pico to protect the communication keys
with the Picosiblings regardless of cold boot protection, as acknowledged by Stannard and
Stajano [8].
3 Our solution in a nutshell
Our core idea is to partition the encrypted storage of the Pico into many small bins,
each holding just a few credentials (ideally just one, subject to technical limitations),
and to redesign the secret sharing scheme and the communication protocol with the
Picosiblings so that only one bin gets decrypted at a time.
Instead of one master key for the whole Pico we now have as many master keys as
there are bins. These are, again, reconstructed from shares supplied by the Picosiblings,
but now the Pico must first ask for the shares that are relevant to a particular bin.
We keep the communication keys with the Picosiblings in tamper-resistant storage
from which the adversary cannot economically extract them. (We could conceivably
also store a “master key to encrypt the whole RAM” in there as well; however, in the
absence of a dedicated cryptoprocessor, the decrypted RAM, or at least the current block
of decrypted RAM, would then have to be written out in some workspace in order to be
used, and we have assumed that the adversary could access that.)
This means that even an adversary who can read the memory of our Pico (except
for the Picosibling communication keys held in tamper-resistant storage) can at most
acquire the credentials of one of the bins. We therefore protect the security token from
cold boot attacks even when it is not possible (for reasons of cost, performance or
simply because the manufacturers will not sell us any potentially suitable hardware) to
resort to enclosing the whole processor and RAM into a tamper-resistant enclosure.
The trade-off of our approach is that, whereas previously when the master key had
been reconstructed all the credentials were available instantly, here the Pico must first
decide which bin of credentials to decrypt, then request the shares of the relevant bin key
from the nearby Picosiblings and only then, after a round trip, will it be able to decrypt
the relevant credentials. This introduces latency. User acceptability of an alternative
security mechanism is largely unaffected by the level of security it offers (which is
unobservable by most users anyway) but is dramatically affected by waiting time. For
this reason, besides developing the crypto, we implemented our system on commercial
off-the-shelf Bluetooth LE development boards in order to measure whether the latency
and power consumption of our approach would be acceptable in a realistic setting.
4 A new secret sharing scheme for authentication tokens
4.1 The Pico credential database
A Pico stores a potentially large number N of user credentials, grouped into 256 bins.7
The value 256 is a parameter of the system; it is straightforward to make it larger, at
the cost of somewhat increased implementation complexity. For each account the user
has, there is one (userid, credential) pair. The user may, but does not have to, use a
different userid for every account. The user may also have several accounts with the
same service, obviously with distinct userids.
7 If N ≤ 256 then each credential has its own bin and can be decrypted independently of
the others. If N > 256 then some bins may contain more than one credential, which will be
encrypted and decrypted together.
The original Pico design [2] was vulnerable to a cold boot attack: the entire cre-
dential database was encrypted with a single master key, shared across the Picosiblings
using Shamir secret sharing [10]. While the Pico was being unlocked, that key, and so
the entire set of credentials, could be exposed. To mitigate this attack, in our design we
encrypt the credentials in each bin with their own bin key.
Doing this in a naive way, however, would require the Picosiblings to each store
shares of hundreds of keys, which is far too much—we want the Picosibling storage
requirements to be very small. To this end, we use a keying polynomial K(y) of degree
r, and set the encryption key for bin β to K(β). The keying polynomial K(y) is shared
to the Picosiblings in the manner described in Section 4.2 below.
The choice of the polynomial degree r is important: the Picosiblings will each have
to store r + 1 key-sized entries, so we would like to keep r small. However, if the Pico
is ever actively unlocking more than r bins at the same time, then at least r+1 values of
K(βi) will be in memory simultaneously. A cold boot attack at that point will be able
to recover the entire polynomial K, and thus decrypt all of the bins. Note that this is
not to say that credentials from at most r bins can be unlocked at any time in the Pico;
once the Pico unlocks a bin (reconstructs the bin key K(βi) and decrypts the desired
credential(s) in the bin), the Pico will wipe the key (and the shares that constructed it)
from memory. It is only if the Pico is actively receiving shares of more than r bin keys
at the same time that the fatal problem arises.
We can therefore choose r to be quite small, and simply program the Pico to never
request more than r key reconstructions in parallel. Indeed, r = 1 is a perfectly reason-
able choice, and results in each Picosibling having to store only two key-sized values—
256 bits in total. (Note that r = 0 corresponds to the original Pico strategy [2] of
encrypting every credential with the same key.)
Appendix A presents the schema for the Pico credential database.
4.2 Bivariate secret sharing
The secret to be shared across the Picosiblings (say there are n Picosiblings) is the
above keying polynomial, which is an arbitrary degree-r polynomial K(y) =
r∑
j=0
kjy
j .
The possible inputs y for this polynomial are bin identifiers (βi), which are values
in a small finite field F. In our implementation, we choose F = GF (28), so the number
of bins is |F| = 256, and each bin identifier is a single byte. However, the outputs of
the polynomial should be encryption keys, which should of course be much larger than
8 bits. Therefore, we select the coefficients kj of the keying polynomial from a vector
space V over F; in particular, we choose V = F16, so that the elements of V are vectors
(arrays) of 16 bytes (128 bits). Thus we write K(y) ∈ V[y].
In order to share an entire polynomialK(y), rather than a single encryption key as in
the original design, we now have the Pico create a bivariate polynomial F(x,y) of degree
(k−1, r)—that is, of degree k−1 in x and of degree r in y: F (x, y) =
k−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=0
aijx
iyj .
For a univariate polynomial, k points yi = f(αi) define a unique polynomial f of
degree k − 1. The equivalent statement for a bivariate polynomial is that k univariate
polynomials fi(y) = F (αi, y) of degree r define a unique bivariate polynomial F of
degree (k − 1, r).
A bivariate secret sharing scheme for n participants (the Picosiblings, in our case)
is defined as follows. Let F be a finite field; V be a vector space over F; k, r, and n be
non-negative integers with 1 ≤ k ≤ n; and α1, . . . , αn be arbitrary distinct non-zero
elements of F. (The αi are the Picosibling identifiers selected by the Pico. Although
our protocol never requires these identifiers to leave the Pico—even the Picosiblings
never learn their own identifiers—they are not security sensitive, in the sense that their
knowledge would not help an adversary guess any of the shares.) As above, the secret
to be shared is the univariate polynomial K(y) =
∑r
j=0 kjy
j ∈ V[y].
For 0 ≤ j ≤ r, set a0j = kj , and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ r, select aij
uniformly at random fromV. Then construct the bivariate polynomialF (x, y) ∈ V[x, y]
as above.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, compute the degree-r polynomial fi(y) = F (αi, y) ∈ V[y],
and send fi(y) (the share) to participant i. Note that the amount of storage this requires
at each participant is r + 1 elements of V.
In a typical secret-sharing protocol, k participants would combine their shares to
recover the shared secret polynomial K(y). Our scenario is slightly different, however;
for a specified bin identifier β, we wish to reconstruct just the single value K(β) ∈ V,
and not the whole polynomialK(y). To accomplish this reconstruction, we will send the
value β to k Picosiblings. Each Picosibling i will reply with vβi = fi(β) = F (αi, β)—
a single value in V. We then perform Lagrange interpolation on the (αi, vβi) pairs in
the usual way to recover F (0, β) = K(β).
We can achieve proactivity [11] by periodically creating n shares of the zero poly-
nomial, and sending them to the Picosiblings to add to their existing shares (queueing
them on the Pico until the next time each Picosibling is encountered—this is safe, since
the queued value reveals no information about either the old or new value of the share of
the keying polynomial). To remove a Picosibling from the scheme, the same mechanism
is used, except the removed Picosibling is not sent a share of the zero polynomial. To
add a Picosibling to the scheme, k existing Picosiblings get together to reconstruct F ,
a new and unused αn+1 6= 0 is picked, and F (αn+1, y) is sent to the new Picosibling.
4.3 Picosibling protocol
We now develop a protocol based on the above bivariate secret sharing scheme that
allows individual bins in the Pico credential database to be unlocked as needed.
Enrollment When a new Picosibling is enrolled to a Pico, the Pico executes a pairing
protocol with the Picosibling in order to establish a random shared symmetric com-
munication key CKi that will be used to protect all communication between the Pico
and that Picosibling. The pairing mechanism is outside the scope of the current discus-
sion; see Krause [12] for a description of the proposed pairing mechanisms for Picos
and Picosiblings. At pairing time, the Pico also selects an arbitrary unused non-zero
αi ∈ F to serve as that Picosibling’s Picosibling identifier. The Pico will store each
of the communication keys CKi in its small tamper-proof memory, while the αi are
not sensitive, and need not be protected in this manner. If the tamper-proof memory is
extremely tight, the CKi can each be derived from a single master 128-bit secret CK∗
as CKi = CBC-MACCK∗(αi); in that case, only the 128-bit CK∗ needs to be stored
in tamper-proof memory.
The first batch of at least k Picosiblings will be enrolled at the time the Pico is
initialized. At this time, the Pico will create the keying polynomial K(y), use it to en-
crypt the credential database, and send shares of K(y) to the Picosiblings as described
above. Later, new Picosiblings can be enrolled by having the Pico communicate with k
existing Picosiblings to reconstruct the entirety of the bivariate polynomial F (x, y) that
produces the shares of the keying polynomial K(y) = F (0, y). The Pico will then send
the new Picosibling the coefficients fi0, fi1 ∈ V of its share of the keying polynomial.
Query share When the user attempts to authenticate to a service, the Pico will look
up the bin identifier β associated with the credential for that service in its credential
database. The Pico will then attempt to construct the bin key K(β) by communicating
with each of k nearby Picosiblings. This communication will be protected using the
above symmetric communication keys CKi.
The Pico sends the value β to each Picosibling; the Picosibling evaluates its share
vβi = fi0 + β ∗ fi1 of the keying polynomial for the specified bin and returns the value
vβi to the Pico.
The Pico (which knows the value of αi associated with each Picosibling) then uses
Lagrange interpolation to find the bin keyK(β) =
k∑
i=1
vβi
∏
1≤j≤k
j 6=i
αj
αj − αi . The bin key
is then used to decrypt the desired credential in bin β of the Pico credential database.
Once the credential is accessed, the shares and the reconstructed K(β) can be deleted
from memory.
The bin key reconstruction process is when the Pico is at its most vulnerable: if it
has received some, but not all, of the k shares it has requested, then an adversary cold
booting the Pico at that point could recover some shares of the bin key, and capturing up
to k− 1 Picosiblings (which is within the threat model) would reveal the bin key to the
adversary. However, unlike the original Pico design, only the credentials in that bin are
revealed, and not all credentials in the Pico. One might be tempted to use a technique
such as that of TRESOR [13] to do the entirety of the bin key reconstruction and bin
decryption in CPU registers; being able to do so would add even more security to our
proposal. We could not experiment with this idea because in our prototype the role of
the Pico was played by a BLE-capable Android phone whose non-Intel CPU did not
support the AES-NI instruction set required by TRESOR.
Query presence Once the credential has been used, the Pico enters into a continu-
ous authentication mode with the service. [2] The continuous authentication uses an
ephemeral key and, therefore, no longer needs access to the credential database. How-
ever, if the Pico is out of range of its siblings it automatically locks and pauses any
active sessions.
While the Pico is in continuous authentication mode, it periodically sends heartbeat
requests to its nearby Picosiblings. As long as k Picosiblings respond to the heartbeat,
the Pico will maintain continuous authentication to the service. These siblings do not
necessarily have to be the devices that initially provided shares to unlock the credential,
although it is reasonable for the Pico to try to contact those devices first.
5 Prototype implementation
To validate and measure the performance of our cryptographic design, we implemented
our scheme on a realistic hardware development platform for wearable devices.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that working Picosiblings as dedicated de-
vices have been prototyped. Our self-imposed implementation constraints attempt to
limit the burden imposed on the user in various dimensions (size, weight, maintenance,
obtrusiveness, cost, etc.). More specifically, Picosiblings should:
– Be small enough to be attached (unobtrusively) to a range of items that users already
frequently carry (such as wallets, phones, and keys).
– Be able to be integrated into items that users carry or wear.
– Operate for many months without charging or replacing batteries.
– Be cheap to purchase and replace.
Whilst somewhat vague, these non-functional requirements introduce a set of con-
straints against which the success of our prototype implementation can be measured.
The Pico and its Picosiblings are heavily asymmetric, with Picosiblings being both
heavily constrained (in terms of size and therefore battery capacity) and poorly re-
sourced (in terms of memory, computation power, and user interface features). Rec-
ognizing this, our implementation is optimized around the most resource-constrained
devices—the Picosiblings.
A defining architectural choice for Picosiblings is the wireless communication pro-
tocol. Low-cost, low-power wireless communication is a key enabling technology for
the Internet of Things (IoT). Of the numerous wireless standards employed in IoT ap-
plications, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is the closest match to Pico’s requirements.
BLE is specifically targeted at scenarios exhibiting significant asymmetry, and has been
designed around the performance of off-the-shelf button-cell batteries. BLE also sup-
ports a privacy feature, in which hardware addresses are encrypted over the air, in order
to avoid tracking of devices [14]; this feature also meshes well with our requirements.
5.1 BLE Picosibling service
In contrast to Bluetooth classic (essentially a cable replacement), BLE is targeted at
applications that transmit only a few octets of data at frequencies ranging from once
a second to every few days, weeks, or months. Such applications typically send only
a limited range of primitive data types; for example, representing the value of a tem-
perature sensor. In BLE, server state is made available through sets of characteristics.
Characteristics group together state (both readable and writable) and metadata such as
name and access permissions. Readable characteristics expose the historic or current
state recorded by the service. For example, a simple light switch service may expose
the state of the light (either on or off). Writable characteristics are commonly used to
command behaviour; for example, turning a light on or off. Characteristics and associ-
ated behaviours are grouped together into reusable components called services. Clients
can interrogate a service’s characteristics and associated metadata to determine how to
interact with the service; this can be viewed as a implementation of the well-known
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) pattern:
A paradigm for organizing and utilizing distributed capabilities that may be
under the control of different ownership domains. It provides a uniform means
to offer, discover, interact with and use capabilities to produce desired effects
consistent with measurable preconditions and expectations. [15]
The following sections provide an overview of the BLE Picosibling service.8
Enrollment To enroll a new Picosibling, it must be first awoken and made discover-
able by the Pico. In our prototype implementation, unenrolled Picosiblings are woken
up by the user pressing a button. However, as the design matures, such UI elements
will be removed. As with commercial BLE beacon devices, awakening the device from
sleep will be performed by the user tapping the device (which is detected by a MEMS
accelerometer). Once awake, the Picosibling enters the BLE general advertising mode.
Whilst in this mode, the Picosibling can accept a connection event from the Pico. Once
connected, the Picosibling’s exposed state can be read and written.
With weaknesses in BLE pairing mechanisms well documented [16], enrollment of
Picosiblings is based upon the principle of “secure at first use”. To enroll a new Picosi-
bling, the Pico writes into it its unique communication key CKi and share fi(y). The
Picosibling’s communication key is exposed by the BLE service as a single 16-byte
(128-bit) write-only characteristic. When this characteristic is written, the Picosibling
performs key diversification9 to generate a further two keys. These keys provide au-
thenticated encryption (encrypt-then-MAC) for messages sent over the air. Transmitted
messages contain counters to prevent reflection and replay attacks.
As noted in Section 4.2, storage for the share requires r + 1 elements of V. In this
case, values inV are vectors (arrays) of 16 elements of F; that is, arbitrary 16-byte (128-
bit) values. Thus, the share fi(y) is represented in the BLE profile as a single 32-byte
write-only characteristic.
Query share/presence To query the Picosibling’s share, the Pico writes the value β
(encrypted and MAC’d using the keys established at enrollment) into a write-only char-
acteristic. This characteristic is 48 bytes in length, with 16 bytes for each of the initial-
ization vector (IV), encrypted payload, and a message authentication code (MAC). On
8 This description is intended to capture the essential features of our implementation rather than
act as a formal specification.
9 The communication key is diversified by performing a CBC-MAC (using the AES coproces-
sor) on two fixed values (1 and 2). The Picosibling does not possess a source of cryptographi-
cally strong randomness, and therefore is not trusted to generate random keys.
Fig. 1. Overview of the Picosibling protocol implementation (left) and the Picosibling profile
implementation (right) in BLE, as UML sequence diagrams.
writing the characteristic, the value is decrypted and verified using the keys established
at enrollment. The decrypted payload is a binary packed data structure containing a
counter (whose value is even for communication from the Pico to the Picosibling, and
odd in the opposite direction), a share flag (set to 1 when the Pico is querying the value
of a share, and 0 when it is merely querying presence), and an 8-bit bin identifier β.
Using the bin identifier β, the Picosibling evaluates its share fi(β).10 The Picosib-
ling share (encrypted and MAC’d) is returned to the Pico by updating a 64-byte read-
only characteristic (16 bytes for the IV, 32 bytes for the encrypted payload, including
the share and the incremented counter, and 16 bytes for the MAC). Changes to this
value are automatically reported as a BLE notification to the Pico.
Querying the Picosibling’s presence is achieved as described above, querying the
Picosibling while setting the share flag to 0.
Figure 1 (left) shows an overview of the BLE Picosibling profile query share and
presence behaviour.
Our prototype Picosiblings have been developed using an off-the-shelf BLE devel-
opment kit from Texas Instruments (TI), described in Appendix B.
5.2 BLE Picosibling profile
A BLE profile specifies the behaviour of the client (in our case, the Pico). Figure 1
(right) gives an overview of the client behaviour when querying the Picosiblings’ shares.
10 As an optimization, computation in GF (28) is performed with two precomputed 256-byte
tables. The first provides provides a lookup i 7→ gi and the second gi 7→ i for a generator
g. Note that although the CC2541 device contains 256 KB of flash, there is not a free 64 KB
segment capable of holding a 256 * 256 B lookup table required for precomputing the entire
multiplication table in GF (28).
Querying presence is largely the same, except that if k responses are not received, the
Pico deletes its continuous authentication keys and locks up, preventing the user (or a
malicious actor) from using the device to authenticate.
Neither BLE nor any of the other commercial wireless communications standards
attempts to mitigate against relay attacks. As relay attacks against wireless communica-
tions are not (currently) viewed as being widely exploitable, commercial manufacturers
find little justification to complicate their implementations by inclusion of complex dis-
tance bounding protocols. We therefore lower our expectations slightly:
– Pico can detect and ignore relay attacks that route messages over the Internet
(where the introduced latencies are sufficiently large to be detected).
To mitigate this attack the Pico client is responsible for measuring round trip times,
ensuring that communication with the Picosiblings has not been routed through the
Internet.
In common with previous work [17], our Pico client is developed as an Android
mobile phone application, which provides the Quasi-Nothing-To-Carry property of the
evaluation framework defined by Bonneau et al. [18]. Our minimal implementation of
Pico supports:
– Requesting Picosibling shares to unlock entries in the credential database (see Ap-
pendix A) and
– querying Picosiblings for user presence.
No other features of Pico are implemented in our prototype client.
6 Performance evaluation
In contrast to typical BLE applications such as remote sensing, where communication
is infrequent and therefore battery life is measured in months or even years, Pico con-
tinually communicates with its Picosiblings to verify that the user, once authenticated,
remains present. Thus a key objective of prototyping is to estimate the impact that the
protocol of Section 4.3 has on the Picosibling’s battery life. Following the detailed guid-
ance given in TI Application Note AN092 [19], we have produced estimates of battery
lifetime under representative conditions with the focus on assessing the broad feasibility
of our architectural choices.
As a first step, we derive an upper bound estimate on battery lifetime. This corre-
sponds to an active but unused Picosibling; that is, a Picosibling that the user is carry-
ing with them but is not one of the k-out-of-n used by Pico when querying a share or
user presence. In contrast to Bluetooth classic, BLE is a connectionless protocol. As
a connection-oriented channel is never established, there is little cost in dropping and
re-establishing connections only when there is useful data to send [20]. When not com-
municating, Picosiblings enter a low-power sleep mode.11 Although Picosiblings spend
11 As detailed in Kamath and Lindh [19], when sleeping the device enters Power Mode 2 where
the current consumed is 1 µA.
Fig. 2. Left: Oscilloscope trace of current consumed by BLE Picosibling during periodic wakeup,
advertising its presence. Right: Oscilloscope trace of the current consumed by a BLE Picosibling
when the Pico is querying its presence. (Note the differences in the horizontal scale.)
the majority of their time asleep, they periodically wake up, advertising their presence
to respond to requests from the Pico device. The time between wakeups, tw, is a pa-
rameter of our system. As mentioned in Section 3, this time controls how long (after
the user initiates a login to a service) the Pico may have to wait before being able to
contact its Picosiblings, and thus complete the login. We want this latency to be low,
but frequent wakeups will decrease battery life. We analyze this tradeoff next.
Figure 2 shows an oscilloscope trace of current consumption12 during the period in
which the Picosibling is advertising its presence to the Pico device. As is evident from
Figure 2, current consumption varies markedly as the Picosibling transitions between
different operating states (notably transmitting and receiving, but also waking up and
preparing for sleep).
We measured the average current during the advertising period to be 10.42 mA. The
time between advertising events is tw; the advertising period is 4.02 ms, with the Pi-
cosibling being asleep (and drawing 1 µA) the remainder of the time. Thus, we estimate
the total average current of an active but unused Picosibling as
((tw−4.02 ms)∗1 µA+(4.02 ms∗10.42 mA))
tw
= 1 µA + 41.9tw µA s.
In the original design [2], Picosibling shares are used to construct a single full-disk
encryption (FDE) key. This FDE key protects the Pico credential database when the
user is not present. In contrast, our scheme requires that decryption keys are recon-
structed on demand; that is, when the user authenticates with a given service. As keys
are reconstructed in the flow of the overall authentication process, response latency is
critical. Sasse et al. [21] report that average completion time for username and pass-
word authentication is on the order of ten seconds.13 In our prototype implementation,
12 Measured as the voltage across a 1 KΩ resistor.
13 This value was produced by applying the KLM-GOMS methodology (a modelling approach
for predicting how long it takes an expert user to accomplish a task on a computing system)
[22].
we chose tw = 1 s, so that the Pico reconstructs the encryption keys within one second
under ideal conditions and within two to three seconds with some radio interference.
This process involves little cognitive effort from the user and is therefore unlikely to be
seen as a major burden. This value of tw yields an average current of about 43 µA.
Assuming 55 mA h is the capacity of a CR1616 battery (see Appendix B for hard-
ware details), that gives an expected battery lifetime of 55 mA h / 43 µA = 1300 hours,
or 53 days. Assuming the capacity of a CR2032 battery is 230 mA h, this results in an
expected battery lifetime of 230 mA h / 43 µA = 5300 hours, or 220 days.
Our estimates indicate that an active but unused Picosiblings can operate on a
CR2032 battery for over seven months. A Picosibling interacting with a Pico will, how-
ever, of course have a somewhat lower battery life; we analyze this effect next. Figure 2
shows the current consumed by the Picosibling when the Pico is querying its presence.
Querying presence requires the client (Pico) to write a single BLE characteristic, with
the response returned via a BLE notification. However, the captured trace exhibits mul-
tiple interactions between the Pico and the Picosibling. Whilst additional messages (for
example for setting up the BLE connection) are expected, the sheer number of inter-
actions was somewhat confusing. On detailed investigation we determined that the TI
BLE stack limits the MTU of user data to 20 bytes (the minimum allowable in the BLE
specification). Thus, when writing or reading characteristics greater than 20 bytes, the
communication is broken into multple packets. As the TI BLE stack is provided as a
binary library, this parameter could not be changed and the presence of these additional
messages is a limitation of our current implementation. We could improve on this, and
thus save time and energy, but only if we had the ability to modify the library.
Figure 2 shows that the Picosibling responds to a query in about 680 ms. This could
be significantly reduced, saving energy, if more data could be sent in each packet. Note
that querying a Picosibling’s share requires exactly the same set of interactions with the
Pico, and therefore takes approximately the same time. The additional processing time
required to evaluate the share is tiny in comparison.
Once a Pico is unlocked, it enters continuous authentication mode. In this mode,
the Pico polls its Picosiblings to ensure that at least k of them remain in the Pico’s
vicinity. How often this polling is done is governed by tc, another parameter of our
system. Again, a higher tc will increase the battery life. This time, the tradeoff is not to
interactive latency, however, but to how long a Pico will stay unlocked after leaving the
aura of its Picosiblings. (Note that tc must be a multiple of tw, as communication can
only occur when the Picosibling wakes up.)
Similar to the above, we compute the average current for a Picosibling undergoing
continuous authentication to be 823tc µA s. This is in addition to the above cost of waking
up every tw, so the total average current is 1 µA+ 41.9tw µA s+
823
tc
µA s. (Although, again,
the numerator 823 could be significantly smaller with an improved BLE stack with a
higher MTU.)
If we retain tw = 1 s, and set tc = 30 s, then the average current is 70 µA. If we are
satisfied with tc = 60 s, the average current is 57 µA. With a CR1616 battery, the latter
figure would give an expected battery lifetime of 960 hours, or 40 days; with a CR2032
battery, the battery life would increase to 4000 hours, or over 165 days. This value is
within the performance requirements for Picosiblings outlined in Section 5 (and would
be even higher with a better BLE stack).
It should also be noted that, under normal circumstances, Pico automatically logs
users out of services when they are away from the terminal used to access those services.
Thus, the Pico does not need to confirm the presence of its Picosiblings continuously. If
a user, for example, is actively logged into a service only half of the time, the lifetime
of a CR2032 battery would be over 190 days with our current implementation.
Additionally, the Picosiblings could use a MEMS accelerometer to notice that they
are not being worn (when, for example, the user is asleep), and go to sleep themselves
for that entire time, without waking up every tw.
Extending the above example, if the user sleeps 8 hours per day, and is actively
logged into a service for half of her waking hours, the lifetime of a CR2032 battery
would be over 280 days.
7 Related work
The most obviously related work is Pico: the relevant papers from Stajano and his group
[2, 6–8, 17] have been extensively referred to throughout the text.
Laurie and Singer [23] argue that it is impossible to have a system which is both
general purpose and trustworthy. Their requirements for a trusted authentication device
(which they refer to as the Neb) closely match those of Pico. However, in contrast to
Pico, the Neb does not attempt to mitigate loss or theft of the device.
FIDO (Fast IDentity Online), an open industry alliance of vendors, including a
who’s who of major players such as Alibaba, American Express, ARM, Google, In-
tel, Mastercard, Microsoft, PayPal, Samsung and Visa, released two sets of specifi-
cations for online authentication: UAF (Universal Authentication Framework) [1] and
U2F (Universal Second Factor) [24]. Both involve authenticating to online services
with a device. UAF replaces passwords entirely by allowing users to authenticate from
a FIDO-enabled device, such as a smartphone. It involves registering the user’s device
to online services and selecting a biometric authentication action, such as swiping a fin-
ger, performed on the device. Pico and FIDO share commonalities in both the problem
they are addressing and their approaches, though it should be noted that Pico predates
the FIDO specifications by over 3 years.
Müller et al.’s TRESOR [13] is closely related to our present work in purpose: it
too is a low-cost protection against cold boot attacks. Their approach is totally differ-
ent, however: it works by running the encryption fully within the CPU registers, with
creative use of the debug registers as crypto storage. We considered how to overcome
the restrictions on the limited register space available, and we would have liked to offer
defense in depth by combining their approach with ours, but were not able to do so
because TRESOR is specific to Intel processors supporting the AES-NI instruction set.
There is prior art on sensing the proximity of a user-worn tag to infer user presence
and lock and unlock devices, from Want et al.’s Active Badge [25], through Landwehr’s
patent [26, 27], and to Corner and Noble’s “Zero-interaction authentication” [4], the
first system in which the user-worn token provided the cryptographic key to unlock the
target device. Sharing the key among multiple devices was first suggested by Desmedt
et al. [3]. Peeters defended a PhD [28] on this topic and, among other contributions,
showed how to securely store a share in a wearable device that does not offer a secure
storage hardware primitive [29]. We did not use it because capturing enough wearables
was outside our threat model, but this is another result that might be profitably combined
with our design to provide defense in depth.
Bivariate secret sharing has been used in prior works; for example, by Cachin et
al. [30] and by Tassa and Dyn [31]. In those works, the secret to be shared was a scalar,
and the bivariate polynomial was used to effectively make shares of shares of the secret.
In contrast, in our work, the secret to be shared is itself the univariate keying polynomial
K(y). This polynomial is not acting in a secret-sharing capacity;K(0) is not special—it
is merely the bin key for bin number 0.
Proactive secret sharing was introduced by Herzberg et al. [11], and mobile proac-
tive secret sharing (MPSS) by Schultz et al. [32]. Those schemes require relatively
heavyweight commitment and public-key primitives. Our system does not require such
primitives, because our threat model is less general. In particular, in our setting, the
dealer (the entity creating the shares from the secret) is the Pico itself, which is as-
sumed to be trusted—there is no need for the Picosiblings to verify that the shares they
receive are consistent. Similarly, although we allow for a mobile adversary that can
compromise Picosiblings over time, we assume that once an adversary compromises
a Picosibling, it cannot be “uncompromised”; that is, the set of compromised Picosib-
lings is non-decreasing. This allows us to use relatively simple protocols for Picosibling
addition and removal, as we do not need to deal with cases where the adversary compro-
mises k−1 Picosiblings before a removal, and a different k−1 Picosiblings afterwards.
(MPSS, on the other hand, does go to great effort to deal with such cases.)
8 Conclusions
The remarkable industry momentum gathering behind the FIDO alliance suggests a
strong convergence towards replacing passwords with a personal authentication token.
If that premise is accepted, the next problem is how to lock and unlock the token to pro-
tect it against unauthorized use. While FIDO UAF [1] offers static unlocking, Pico [2]
adopts the proximity-based threshold scheme pioneered by Desmedt et al. [3], using it
as a platform for continuous authentication.
We found Pico vulnerable to a cold boot attack: an adversary who captured a run-
ning Pico and was able to read its RAM would be able to steal all the credentials of the
user. We designed and prototyped a low-cost mitigation for this vulnerability, without
resorting to the silver bullet of making the whole security token tamper-proof. Boot-
strapping all security from a small amount of tamper-resistant flash memory (which
Pico requires anyway, regardless of our contribution), we protect the user’s credentials
against an adversary who may read out all the flash and RAM of a running token. Our
new secret sharing scheme, based on a bivariate polynomial, allows only a small frac-
tion of the credentials to be exposed at a time. Our solution scales to a high number of
credentials while imposing only a constant (and small) storage cost on the Picosiblings.
We have prototyped our cryptographic design on COTS hardware and measured
its performance in terms of power consumption and latency. Our Picosibling prototype
lasts for 165–220 days (depending on how frequently the user is authenticated to a ser-
vice) on a CR2032 button-cell battery, with an observed authentication latency of 2–3
seconds. We also show how a simple accelerometer detecting when the Picosibling is
not being worn could increase the battery life by about 50%. Fixing gratuitous ineffi-
ciencies in the BLE stack would increase it further.
We trust readers will agree that our prototype, though not yet ready for prime time,
soundly demonstrates the viability of our design: if it were made into a commercial
product, battery life and latency could be improved even further.
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Appendix A Schema of the Pico credential database
Table 1 shows the schema of the Pico credential database. Each row in this database
is indexed by a hash of the service’s identifier H(IDS). Each of the N rows in the
Pico credential database contains a 1-byte bin identifier β1, . . . , βN , an encrypted cre-
dential, and other information required to identify the account to the user. Note that
if N > 256, then there will be multiple credentials in the same bin; those credentials
will be encrypted with the same key. A cold boot attack during a bin key reconstruction
will reveal all of the credentials in the bin, and not just the credential being actively
requested—but only a fraction of one percent of all the credentials, and not all of them,
as in the previous design.
Table 1. Schema of the Pico credential database. Depending on the scenario, credentials may be
public/private key pairs or symmetric keys shared with the service. Note that Google and Expedia
end up in the same bin, that the user shares the same userid for Expedia and Amazon, and that
the user has two distinct Twitter accounts, which she distinguishes by the userid.
Hash of service’s
identifier
Bin
identi-
fier
Encrypted credential Userid
H(IDGoogle) 0x1e {credGoogle,jane.doe}K(0x1e) jane.doe
H(IDAmazon) 0x75 {credAmazon,jane257}K(0x75) jane257
H(IDTwitter) 0x57 {credTwitter,@jane}K(0x57) @jane
. . . . . . . . . . . .
H(IDExpedia) 0x1e {credExpedia,jane257}K(0x1e) jane257
H(IDTwitter) 0x32 {credTwitter,@tattoophile}K(0x32) @tattoophile
Appendix B Hardware Prototype Platform
Our prototype Picosiblings have been developed using an off-the-shelf BLE develop-
ment kit from Texas Instruments (TI), shown in Figure 3. The TI development board
is built around a power-optimised system-on-chip (SoC) solution targeting BLE and
proprietary 2.4 GHz RF applications [33]. The development kit includes a hardware de-
bugger and full source code for Operating System (OSAL) and Hardware Abstraction
Layers (HAL). The BLE protocol stack is provided as a set of binary libraries. Software
for the platform is built using the third-party IAR Embedded Workbench toolchain.
The CC2541’s main features include:
– High-performance low-power 8-bit 8051 processor
– 256 KB flash and 8 KB RAM (retained in all power states)
– Peripherals including watchdog and general-purpose timers, 2x USART, I2C, and
AES coprocessor
– 6 mm x 6 mm QFN40 package
Fig. 3. Texas Instruments CC2541DK-MINI Bluetooth Low Energy development kit.
Fig. 4. The two standard coin batteries we used. Left: CR1616 (16 mm diameter, 1.6 mm thick-
ness, ≈55 mA h). Right: CR2032 (20 mm diameter, 3.2 mm thickness, ≈230 mA h).
In volume, the CC2541 SoC is priced at approximately $4. However, assuming price
falls in line with trends witnessed with classic Bluetooth, it can be expected to approach
the $2–3 range as the technology becomes ubiquitous. As the CC2541 SoC requires
relatively few additional discrete components the bill of materials for a Picosibling built
using this device could comfortably sit in the $3–4 range. This is, arguably, sufficiently
cheap for users not to worry about purchasing and replacing devices.
Standard button-cell CR1616 and CR2032 batteries (shown in Figure 4) are reason-
able batteries to use in our scenario, as their size makes them well suited to wearable
electronics and embedding in jewellery.
